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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This appeal involves several issues relating to the preclusion
of a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The first issue
addresses whether the citizen suit by Friends of Lustra (FOL) is
barred under CWA section 505 by the administrative order issued
by the Rocky Mountain Department of Environmental and Natu-
ral Resources (RMDENR). The second issue addresses whether
the citizen suit by FOL is barred under CWA section 309(g)(6)(A)
by the administrative order issued by RMDENR. The third issue
addresses whether the continued presence of overburden in Lus-
tra Creek (or "Creek") after it was discharged there without a per-
mit, constitutes a continuing violation of CWA section 301(a). The
fourth issue addresses whether the state's administrative order
precludes the citizen suit by res judicata. Finally, the fifth issue
addresses whether the suit by FOL against Magma Mining Co.
(MMC) is moot. This brief provides arguments on both sides of the
issues.
The focus of the instant case is the discharge of overburden by
MMC into Lustra Creek in the state of Rocky Mountain (RM).
FOL, a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting Lustra
Creek, brought a citizen suit against MMC for alleged violations of
the CWA. FOL appeals the opinion of the United States District
Court for New Union, which held that the state's action was dili-
gent prosecution and bars the citizen suit by FOL for both civil
penalties and injunctive relief. Moreover, the Court held that the
suit by FOL is also barred by res judicata and is also moot since no
case or controversy remains to justify federal jurisdiction. RM en-
tered the case to defend the actions it has taken and to secure
future compliance with state and federal law.
MMC placed overburden in Lustra Creek intermittently be-
tween January 1980 and January 1998, but has not placed any
there since 1998. There is however, a final phase planned for the
mine for which it will be necessary to remove overburden and
MMC does not have a plan in place for how it will dispose of such
overburden. In 1993, RMDENR issued a notice of violation (NOV)
against MMC for violating the Rocky Mountain Solid Waste Act
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(RMSWA) by disposing of overburden into a landfill without a per-
mit. RMDENR and MMC agreed to a consent order in 1994, in
which MMC was required to cease dumping waste overburden in
the Creek without a permit and to plant the Creek landfill with
native vegetation. RMDENR found that the removal of the over-
burden from the Creek would cause more harm than leaving it in
the Creek and therefore did not require its removal as part of the
consent agreement. RMDENR did not give any public notice of
the NOV, its intent to issue the consent order, or its issuance of
the order.
FOL argues that in order to determine if a prosecution is dili-
gent, the court must look at the result of the prosecution. Because
the prosecution did not result in penalties or removal of the over-
burden, it is therefore not diligent, and the holding by the District
Court should be overturned.
MMC and RM argue that to determine if a prosecution is dili-
gent, the court must look at the process of the prosecution. Moreo-
ver, they argue that state agencies have been given prosecutorial
discretion to reach agreements with polluters, and citizens groups
should not be permitted to second guess the decisions of the state
agencies in enforcement matters. Therefore, the court should af-
firm the decision of the lower court.
FOL and RM maintain that the continued presence of the
overburden in the Creek amounts to a continuing violation of the
CWA. They argue that where fill material is discharged into a
navigable water without a permit, the violation continues until
the fill is removed. They cite many CWA cases involving the fill of
wetlands and similar RCRA cases assessing penalties for as long
as the fill or waste remains.
MMC argues that since it is not currently adding overburden
into the Creek, it is not currently in violation of the CWA. MMC
relies on the plain meaning of the statute, as well as the Gwaltney
case.
FOL also claims that its suit is not barred by res judicata. It
claims that the Full Faith and Credit Act does not apply to deter-
minations by an administrative body. FOL further argues that
under state law the claims are different because the thing sued
for is different, the causes of action are different, and they are not
in privity with RM, and therefore, should not be held to the con-
sent agreement reached between RM and MMC. Moreover, FOL
claims that the CWA has carved out an exception to full faith and
credit, and therefore, even if FOL would be precluded under state
2001]
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law from bringing its suit, it should not be precluded here unless
the Court determines there is diligent prosecution, which FOL
claims there is not.
MMC and RM claim that the suit by FOL is barred by res
judicata. They claim that full faith and credit does apply to ad-
ministrative bodies and, under state law, the suit by FOL would
be precluded because they are suing for the same thing as
RMDENR, the causes of action are the same, and FOL is in privity
with RM. Moreover, they claim that the CWA does not evince any
exception to full faith and credit and the Court should follow state
law as to its res judicata determination.
Finally, FOL will argue that the case is not moot because the
overburden remains in the Creek and FOL has a cognizable inter-
est in having it removed. In the alternative, if the Court does not
agree that MMC is still in violation, FOL argues that this falls
under the voluntary cessation doctrine, and the Court is not de-
prived of jurisdiction because there is a danger that MMC will
recommence its illegal activity.
MMC and RM will argue that the case is moot because MMC
is no longer in violation of the CWA. Moreover, the voluntary ces-
sation doctrine does not apply because its compliance was not vol-
untary, but instead a result of a consent agreement between itself
and RM.
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR THE JUDGES
SAMPLE QUESTION ON THE DILIGENT PROSECUTION
ISSUE
Questions for FOL:
1. How can this Court allow their suit to continue when the Su-
preme Court in Gwaltney, specifically stated that the role of citi-
zen suits is to supplement not supplant government action?
2. If "diligent" is defined in terms of the effort injected into a pro-
cess, how can the result matter in determining diligent
prosecution?
3. How can an administrative order not bar a citizen suit when
the court in Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co. held that it could?
4. Why does the state statute under which MMC was prosecuted,
matter in determining diligent prosecution when the results ob-
tained were the same as they would have been under the CWA?
[Vol. 19202
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Questions for MMC and RM:
1. How can there be diligent prosecution when RMDENR did not
even achieve compliance with the statute by requiring removal of
the overburden?
2. How can an administrative order meet the qualification of 'in a
court' when CWA section 505 is so clear that only action in court
will bar a citizen suit?
3. How can the state solid waste statute qualify under CWA sec-
tion 309 as a state statute comparable to the CWA?
4. How can FOL's suit be barred when the state is no longer pros-
ecuting MMC and assessed no penalty against MMC?
SAMPLE QUESTIONS ON THE CONTINUING
VIOLATION ISSUE
Question for FOL and RM:
1. How can MMC be in violation of the CWA when it is no longer
placing overburden in the Creek?
Question for MMC:
1. How can MMC not be in violation of the statute when the over-
burden remains in the Creek?
SAMPLE QUESTIONS ON THE RES JUDICATA ISSUE
Questions for FOL:
1. How can the things sued for not be identical when the goal of
the citizen suit is to obtain compliance with the statute, which
was also the goal of the action by RMDENR?
2. How can the cause of action in the citizen suit be different from
that in the action by RMDENR when both arose out of the dump-
ing of the overburden into the Creek?
3. How can FOL not be in privity with RMDENR when plaintiffs
prosecuting citizen suits are merely acting as private attorneys
general?
4. How can the CWA contain an exception to full faith and credit
when there is nothing in the statute that clearly demonstrates
this intent by Congress?
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Questions for MMC and RM:
1. How can the things sued for be identical when FOL is suing for
penalties and the removal of the fill, neither of which RMDENR
sought?
2. How can the causes of action be the same when one was
brought under a solid waste statute and one is brought under the
CWA?
3. How can the CWA not contain an exception to full faith and
credit when the statute speaks specifically to when a citizen suit
should be precluded?
SAMPLE QUESTIONS ON THE MOOTNESS ISSUE
Question for FOL and RM:
1. How can there still be a live controversy when MMC is no
longer in violation of the statute?
Question for MMC:
1. How can the case be moot when the overburden remains in the
Creek?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Is the Citizen Suit by FOL Under Clean Water Act
Section 505 Barred Under Section 505(B)(1)(B) by the
Administrative Order Issued by RMDENR?
CWA section 505(b)(1)(B) states: "[nlo action may be com-
menced ... if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard,
limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United
States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right." (emphasis
added).
A. IS RMDENR DILIGENTLY PROSECUTING MMC?
1. FOL argues that to determine if an agency is diligently
prosecuting, look at the result.
FOL will likely argue that in order to determine if an agency
has diligently prosecuted and therefore barred a citizen suit, one
looks at the result of the government action. Some courts hold
that whether a completed government enforcement action has
been diligently prosecuted depends on whether it protects citizens
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or the environment, or the degree to which it protects them. See
Hudson River Scoop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 591 F.
Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). In Atlantic States Legal Fund, Inc. v.
Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind.
1990), the court held that there was no diligent prosecution where
compliance with the CWA was not obtained, there was an appar-
ent willingness by the state agency to "bend its procedures on [pol-
luter's] behalf," and an insubstantial penalty was assessed.
Similarly here, RMDENR did not obtain compliance with the CWA
since the overburden remains and no penalty was assessed on
MMC for its violations. Therefore, there is no diligent prosecu-
tion. See also Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.
Ohio 1996) (citizen suit barred only if state commences civil action
to require compliance with the same standard, limitation, or order
referenced in plaintiffs 60-day notice letter); Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995) (state's failure to re-
quire compliance with the permit is some evidence that its prose-
cution was not diligent; assessment of $100,000 penalty when
economic benefit of non-compliance was far higher, is evidence
prosecution was not diligent); Public Interest Research Group of
N.J. v. Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1991) (EPA's failure to re-
quire compliance with effective permit is evidence that prosecu-
tion was not diligent); New York Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n v. New
York City Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(court held that state's allowance of the discharge of leachate into
the bay for twelve years, until defendant submitted a proposal for
its elimination, was not diligent prosecution).
FOL also may make a somewhat different statutory interpre-
tation argument. CWA section 505(b)(1)(B) uses the word "prose-
cuting", as a present tense verb. The Supreme Court in Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 60 (1987), reasoned that the use of tenses is decisive in inter-
preting section 505, holding that the section's use of the present
tense "alleged to be in violation" in conferring jurisdiction, limits
jurisdiction to cases in which the defendant is in continuing viola-
tion. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning, here, the agency is
no longer prosecuting MMC and therefore the statutory bar for
diligently "prosecuting" can no longer apply. See Knee Deep Cattle
Co., Inc. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996).
20011 205
9
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
2. MMC and RM argue that to determine if an agency is
diligently prosecuting, look at the process.
MMC and RM will argue that the state agency has
prosecutorial discretion, including the right to settle if it sees fit.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court stated in Gwaltney, "the citizen
suit is meant to supplement rather than to supplant government
action." 484 U.S. at 60. Therefore, the agency is entitled to defer-
ence in the way it chooses to enforce. So here, even if FOL does
not agree with the result of the prosecution by RMDENR, it is not
for them to substitute their judgment for that of the agency. See
North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949
F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991) (state issued administrative order
requiring town to begin construction of a sewage plant, requiring
cessation of the violation until the plant was built, and assessing
no penalty, held to be diligent prosecution).
The plain meaning of the word "diligent" is "characterized by
steady, earnest, and energetic effort." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 378
(3d ed. 1995). Therefore, diligent prosecution is litigation pursued
steadily, earnestly and energetically. As long as the proper effort
is injected into the process, it is diligent prosecution, regardless of
the outcome. After all, even if the state diligently prosecutes a
case, it could lose if pressed to a trial on the merits. United States
v. ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). MMC and RM will
argue that the state agency entered into a negotiation process
with MMC to obtain compliance. Although the result obtained
may not be satisfactory to FOL, the agency did go through the en-
forcement process and entered into an agreement with MMC to
ensure future compliance. Although FOL may not agree with the
result obtained by RMDENR, it failed to show the state's effort
was not steady, earnest, and energetic. Moreover, it is not the role
of citizens' suits under the CWA to question the result of the en-
forcement action by the state. The purpose of the bar is to allow
the state to do its enforcement job without interference by citizen
groups. This not only applies during the enforcement action, but
after as well. If it did not apply after the enforcement action was
over, there would not be any incentive for polluters to settle with
the state agency. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 (stating citizen suit
not to interfere with EPA or state discretion in settling a case not
to seek a civil penalty); Supporter's to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v.
Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1992) (Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act citizen suit diligent prosecution bar does
not require that EPA succeed, but only that it try diligently; col-
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lateral attack on agency's strategy or tactics is not authorized).
See also William Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Co., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) (CWA citizen suit diligent prosecution bar applies to
state order even though injured landowner asserting CWA claim
may have preferred a more vigorous enforcement and remediation
program).
B. WAS THE ACTION BY RMDENR 'IN A COURT'?
1. FOL will argue that the plain meaning of the statute is
that 'in a court' means just that, in a judicial court
proceeding.
FOL argues that under the plain meaning of the statute, the
administrative consent order issued by RMDENR was not enforce-
ment 'in a court' and thus does not bar the action by FOL. Many
courts have held that the language of the CWA section 505 "unam-
biguously and without qualification refers to an action in a Court
of the United States, or a State," and thus an administrative en-
forcement action by a federal or state agency does not preclude a
citizen suit. Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d
57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Jones v. City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d
410 (6th Cir. 1999); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d
1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987); Illinois Public Interest Research Group
v. PMC, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Lykins v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (E.D. Ky. 1989). More-
over, it is clear elsewhere in the statute that Congress knows how
to write a provision which gives administrative orders preclusive
effect over citizen suits, when it wants to, as it did in CWA section
309(g). By contrast, when Congress established preclusive effect
in CWA section 505 only for actions in court, it did not mean to do
so for administrative actions.
FOL also argues that even if an administrative body can be a
court, it can be so only if it possesses full remedial powers inher-
ent in traditional courts, and it must allow for citizens to inter-
vene. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120
(D. Md. 1985). See also Student Public Interest Research Group of
N.J. v. Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985)
(EPA's informal enforcement procedure was not a proceeding in
court which bars a section 505 citizen suit, when it consisted en-
tirely of negotiations between EPA and the violator and did not
incorporate independent decision maker or administrative law
judge to weigh evidence; did not allow for opposing parties to pre-
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sent such evidence; did not provide for calling of witnesses, for a
hearing, or for formal transcripts or records of decisions to be
maintained; and did not allow participation of student interest
group); Baughman v. Bradford, 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979) (Penn-
sylvania Environmental Hearing Board was not a 'court' because
it had limited penalty power, did not have the power to enjoin vio-
lations, and did not allow citizen's to intervene); Atlantic Legal
Foundation v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (state agency lacked power to provide relief
sought by citizen group, and did not allow for citizen intervention
in administrative enforcement action; citizen suit allowed).
Therefore, since FOL was not permitted to intervene in the negoti-
ations between RMDENR and MMC, and there was not any inde-
pendent decision maker involved, it would seem that the processes
that led to the consent order would not be sufficient to be defined
as a court under the CWA. Since RMDENR does not have the
power to enforce the civil penalties it assesses without resort to a
court, under the holding in Simkins, 617 F.Supp. 1120, the action
by the state agency is not the functional equivalent to a court pro-
ceeding. Moreover, as in Universal Tool, 735 F.Supp. 1404, the
state statute here does not provide for citizen intervention in the
administrative enforcement action.
2. MMC and RM will argue that an administrative agency
may be a court.
MMC and RM will argue that an administrative agency may
be a court if its powers and characteristics are sufficiently like
those of a court and such a classification is necessary to achieve
statutory goals. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215,
217 (3d Cir. 1979). An administrative agency may be a court if
"the state agency ha[s] coercive powers to compel compliance with
effluent limitations and there [are] procedural similarities to a
suit in federal court with citizens having the right to intervene."
Atlantic Legal Found. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F.
Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990). MMC will argue that the state
agency has the power to compel compliance with effluent limita-
tions and, in fact, did so.
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II. IS THE CITIZEN SUIT BY FOL BARRED BY THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ISSUED BY RMDENR
UNDER CWA SECTION 309(G)(6)(A)?
Section 309(g) of the CWA was added by Congress in 1987 giv-
ing the EPA authority to assess penalties administratively. In-
cluded in the new authority was CWA section 309(g)(6)(A) which
pertains to limitation on actions under other sections and states:
Action taken by the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case
may be, under this subsection shall not affect or limit the Ad-
ministrator's or Secretary's authority to enforce any provision of
this chapter; except that any violation -
(i) with respect to which the Administrator or the Secretary
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action
under this subsection,
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable
to this subsection
or
(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the State has
issued a final order not subject to further judicial review
and the violator has paid a penalty assessed under this sub-
section, or such comparable State law, as the case may be,
shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under sub-
section (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this title or
section 1365 of this title. (emphasis added).
A. IS RMDENR DILIGENTLY PROSECUTING MMC?
The arguments regarding diligent prosecution made under
CWA section 505(b)(1)(B) can also be made under CWA section
309(g)(6)(a)(ii). But, the argument that the failure to assess pen-
alties denotes a failure to diligently prosecute is made in a differ-
ent statutory context under CWA section 309(g)(6), since section
309(g)(6)(A)(iii) specifically provides a bar when penalties are as-
sessed and paid. This strengthens the argument that "diligently
prosecuting" applies only to ongoing prosecutions, not completed
ones.
20011 209
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1. FOL will argue that if an enforcement action is
completed, assessment of civil penalties is necessary
for an agency action to be considered diligent
prosecution.
FOL will argue that since RMDENR only sought compliance
in its action against MMC, and did not seek or assess penalties
and none were paid, its action is not barred under CWA section
309(g)(6)(A)(iii). Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, 891 F.
Supp. 1389 (D. Haw. 1995) (in order for a state enforcement action
to bar citizens suits under the CWA, state enforcement must seek
penalties, not mere compliance). See also Citizens for a Better En-
vironment v. Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889, 906 (N.D. Cal.
1994) ("Only where a state has proceeded (and assessed a penalty)
under a state enforcement provision comparable to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g) is the preclusive bar triggered."); Public Interest Re-
search Group v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174, 184
(D.N.J. 1992) (section 1319(g) held inapplicable because, inter
alia, "no penalties were assessed."); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n. v. Bekaert
Corp., 791 F. Supp. 769, 775 (W.D. Ark. 1992) ("Congress has not
provided that citizen suits are barred whenever an administrative
action is underway or simply because there may be some duplica-
tion with a government proceeding.").
Moreover, FOL will argue that neither part of CWA section
309(g) (6)(A) applies to the facts of this case. The plain meaning of
the statutory language is that unless an action is "still being pros-
ecuted," CWA section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), and "penalty was assessed,"
section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii), then section 309(g)(6)(A) does not apply
and thus the citizen suit is not barred under this section. Here,
the case is not still being prosecuted and no penalty was assessed,
or even sought. Therefore, CWA section 309 does not apply. See
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111
(9th Cir. 1996) (under section 309(g), a citizen suit is precluded if
a state is currently and diligently prosecuting the action under
state law comparable to federal enforcement provision; state en-
forcement action no longer being prosecuted following settlement
with alleged polluter and thus the citizen suit was not precluded).
See also Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995) (court held that to bar a citizen civil
penalty action, the state must be diligently pursuing a penalty ac-
tion comparable to section 309(g), since the NMED was not cur-
rently seeking penalties, administrative or otherwise, court held
section 309(g) did not apply).
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2. MMC and RM will argue that assessment of civil
penalties is not needed in order for agency action to
be considered diligent prosecution.
MMC and RM will argue that even a final state order that
does not assess penalties can bar a subsequent citizen suit under
CWA section 309(g)(6)(A). In North & South Rivers Watershed As-
sociation v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557, the First Circuit
examined an administrative order issued by the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to the Town of
Scituate. DEP ordered Scituate to upgrade its sewage treatment
facility, which discharged pollutants into a coastal estuary with-
out a permit, and report to DEP periodically. The North and
South Rivers Watershed Association brought suit to obtain finan-
cial penalties and injunctive relief under the CWA after issuance
of the order. The court reasoned that the main goal of the CWA is
to restore and protect the integrity of the water, and further
stated that the "primary function of the provision for citizen suits
is to enable private parties to assist in enforcement efforts where
Federal and State authorities appear unwilling to act." Scituate,
949 F.2d 552. The Scituate court decided that "[diuplicative ac-
tions aimed at exacting financial penalties in the name of environ-
mental protection at a time when remedial measures are well
underway do not further this goal. They are, in fact, impediments
to environmental remedy efforts." Scituate, 949 F.2d 552. The
court held that a state order that did not assess penalties was still
considered diligent prosecution since "the state order represented
a substantial, considered and ongoing response to the violation,
and DEP's enforcement action does in fact represent diligent pros-
ecution." 949 F.2d at 556. See also Connecticut Coastal Fisher-
man's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn.
1994) (section 1319(g)(6) "bars citizen suits where a state agency
conducting enforcement proceedings against the defendant has
authority to assess civil penalties, regardless of whether the
agency has actually assessed such penalties"); Sierra Club v. Colo-
rado Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994) (state action
need not entail monetary penalties to have preclusive effect).
B. IS THE LAW UNDER WHICH MMC WAS PROSECUTED
A 'COMPARABLE STATE LAW'?
Under CWA section 309(g)(6)(A) the state law under which
the polluter is being prosecuted must be comparable to subsection
20011
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(g) of section 309. This means that it must provide for administra-
tive penalties, section 309(g)(2); provide public notice, section
309(g)(4)(A); and provide interested parties a hearing, section
309(g)(4)(C).
1. FOL will argue that the state statute does not
sufficiently provide for citizen participation and that
it is not comparable to CWA section 309(g) because
it is in a solid waste statute, not a water
pollution statute.
FOL will argue that CWA section 309 requires the state stat-
ute to provide for the public's right to participate in the adminis-
trative enforcement process and therefore, the state statute is not
comparable for the purposes of section 309. See Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
Here, since the state statute lacks public notice and comment pro-
visions regarding the issuance of the consent order, that is enough
to make the state statute inapposite under section 309 of the
CWA. See Public Interest Research Group v. GAF Corp., 770 F.
Supp. 943 (D.N.J. 1991) (court allowed a citizen suit to proceed
regardless of a previous action by NJDEP because the consent or-
der was issued without public notice and comment). See also
Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1996)
(holding that a state's denial of citizen's opportunity to intervene
or comment upon consent order in state's civil enforcement action
provided basis for holding that civil action was not diligently pros-
ecuted); Atlantic Legal Found. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.,
735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding Indiana law not com-
parable because it does not provide for public notice and participa-
tion, penalty assessment, judicial review and other matters
required by Clean Water Act).
FOL will also argue that since RMDENR sought enforcement
against the overburden in the stream under its solid waste law
instead of under its clean water law, it did not seek enforcement
under a statute comparable to the CWA. In Murray v. Bath Iron
Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33 (D. Me. 1994), the court held that
Maine's administrative action relating to a landfill site did not bar
a CWA citizen suit against the shipyard facility operator, which
used a landfill site to dispose of hazardous waste. In that case,
Maine had not undertaken administrative action under its clean
water legislation, but it had declared the site a threat to public
health and mandated abatement actions under another statute.
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The abatement, however, was ordered with no specific emphasis
on protection of waterways, and its administrative action related
to the general management of the site as a hazardous substance
site and not to concerns surrounding discharge of pollutants into
water. In the instant case, there was similarly no emphasis on the
protection of the waterway in RM's solid waste order since it con-
tained no request to remove the overburden in the stream. There-
fore, there is obviously no evidence that the purpose of the action
by RMDENR was related to concern over the discharge of pollu-
tants into the water.
Since environmental statutes protect different parts of the en-
vironment, FOL will argue that the action brought under the state
solid waste statute cannot sufficiently protect the waters of the
state. Under Chemical Weapons Working Group v. United States
Department of Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997), each envi-
ronmental statute protects separate and distinct parts of the envi-
ronment and therefore, an action to protect water should be
brought under a clean water statute, not a solid waste statute, or
in the case of Chemical Weapons, a clean air statute.
MMC and RM will rely heavily on the Scituate case in making
their arguments. 949 F.2d 552. There is a distinction between the
instant case and Scituate however, since RM's order not only fails
to assess penalties, but also fails to force removal of the overbur-
den from the stream. Therefore, Scituate, may not apply.
2. MMC and RM argue that the state statute sufficiently
provides for citizen participation and is comparable to
CWA section 309(g) even though it is a solid waste
statute.
MMC and RM will argue that it is not necessary for the state
statute to provide for citizen participation for it to be comparable
to the CWA. In North & South Rivers Watershed Association, Inc.
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, the court held that the interests
of affected citizens were protected where the state statute pro-
vided that orders were public records; therefore, public notice is
not necessary to make statutes comparable. Following Scituate,
even though there was no public notice of the consent order issued
by RMDENR, the statutes can be comparable. See also Williams
Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997)
(state law comparable to CWA as long as it contains comparable
penalty provisions which state is authorized to enforce, has same
overall enforcement goals as CWA, provides interested citizens a
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meaningful opportunity to participate at significant stages of deci-
sion making process, and adequately safeguards their legitimate
substantive interests); California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v.
City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (hold-
ing mandatory public notice and participation was not essential to
a finding of comparability); Save Our Bays and Beaches v. City of
Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Haw. 1994) (comparable state
law does not mean that statute's regulatory authority or processes
must be identical to federal government's); Pape v. Menominee,
911 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (state water resources statute
that required water resources commission to conduct business at
public meetings, provided for assessment of penalties and lists of
factors to be considered in imposing penalties for violations of
statute, and provided for judicial review of actions under statute,
was comparable to CWA for purposes of determining whether con-
sent order between violator and state agency prohibited citizens'
suits under CWA); Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F. Supp. 914 (D. Or.
1993) (while mandatory public notice and participation rights
have been held to be indispensable elements in determining com-
parability of state remedy with remedy under CWA, for purposes
of availability of citizen suit, mandatory public notice is not sine
qua non of comparability; it is important to avoid subjecting a vio-
lator to dual enforcement actions for the same violation.
MMC and RM will argue that when determining whether an
action was brought under a comparable state statute, the focus
should not be on the portion of the environment that the statute
primarily protects, but on whether the corrective action that has
already been taken and diligently pursued by the government
seeks to remedy the same violations as the duplicative civilian ac-
tion. Duplicative actions aimed at exacting financial penalties in
the name of environmental protection at a time when remedial
measures are well under way do not further the remedial goal of
this statute. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556. MMC and RM will argue
that since the state has already issued an order with regard to the
same polluting offense as the citizens are now attempting to en-
force, and the action by the FOL would be duplicative in nature,
FOL's action should be barred. See Hudson Riverkeeper Fund,
Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assoc., 917 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (the court concluded that the pending state court action was
the equivalent of one brought under RCRA, because as a matter of
New York State jurisdiction and procedure, all cases brought in
the New York Supreme Court are, as a matter of law, brought
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under all applicable federal statutory provisions applicable by
their terms to the "occurrence or transaction" sued on, except
where Congress has reserved exclusive jurisdiction to a federal
court). See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989) (the court held that actions by the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineer-
ing in which it entered a stipulated agreement with the polluter
for improper disposal of hazardous waste, not under the state's
water statute, was a bar to a citizen's suit action under CWA sec-
tion 309(g)(6)).
C. UNDER SECTION 309(G)(6)(A), DOES THE STATE
ACTION BAR CITIZEN SUITS FOR INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF OR ONLY FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES?
1. FOL argues that the section 309 bar only applies to
actions for civil penalties.
FOL will argue that the plain language of section 309(g)
(6)(A) is clear and that it only precludes citizen suits for civil pen-
alties. See Coalition for a Livable West Side, Inc. v. New York City
DEC, 830 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (held civil penalty portion
of citizen suit was barred by administrative order issued by NYS-
DEP). See also Orange Environment, Inc. v. County of Orange,
860 F. Supp. 1003, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting the Scituate
holding as to injunctive relief and ruling that section 1319(g) bars
only civil penalties).
2. MMC and RM argue that the section 309 bar applies
not only to actions for civil penalties, but also actions
for injunctive and declaratory relief.
MMC and RM's argument that section 309 bars not only ac-
tions for civil penalties, but also for injunctive and declaratory re-
lief will rely heavily on the court's decision in North & South
Rivers Watershed Association, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, in which it
held that the section 309(g) bar applies to all claims filed under
section 505, including claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
949 F.2d at 555. The court stated that "when it appears that gov-
ernment action ... begins and is diligently prosecuted, the need
for citizen suit disappears." Id. The court further reasoned that
because section 505's diligent prosecution bar does not distinguish
between suits for civil penalties and suits for injunctive relief,
2001] 215
19
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
courts applying section 309(g)'s diligent prosecution provision
should also not distinguish between the two. It stated, "the focus
of the statutory bar to citizen's suits is not on state statutory con-
struction, but on whether corrective action already taken and dili-
gently pursued by the government seeks to remedy the same
violation as duplicative citizen action." Id. at 556. See also Arkan-
sas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D.
Ark. 1993).
III. DOES THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF
OVERBURDEN IN THE CREEK AFTER IT WAS
DISCHARGED THERE WITHOUT A PERMIT
CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING VIOLATION
OF CWA SECTION 301(A)?
A. The Statute
CWA section 301(a) prohibits the discharge of any pollutant
without a permit. CWA section 502(12) defines the discharge of a
pollutant as any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source. CWA section 505(a) gives jurisdiction to
the courts over a suit by a citizen against an alleged polluter that
is 'alleged to be in violation' of section 301(a).
B. DOES 'ALLEGED TO BE IN VIOLATION' MEAN ONLY
THE ORIGINAL ADDITION OF THE POLLUTANT TO
NAVIGABLE WATER OR ALSO THE CONTINUED
PRESENCE OF THE POLLUTANT IN NAVIGABLE
WATER?
1. FOL and RM argue that the continued presence of the
overburden in the Creek amounts to a continuing
violation under section 505(a).
FOL and RM will argue that the failure to take remedial mea-
sures to remove illegally discharged material from navigable
water is a continuous violation for the purpose of determining citi-
zen suit jurisdiction because the injury arises not only from the
discharge of the waste into navigable water, but also from the con-
tinuing environmental degradation as long as the waste remains
there. See North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Woodbury, 1989 WL
106517 (E.D.N.C. 1989). Here, the overburden remains in the
Creek and, thus, the violation is continuing. See also United
States v. Reaves, 923 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (unpermitted
discharge of dredged or fill materials into wetlands on the site is a
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continuing violation for as long as the fill remains). Moreover,
they will argue that cases to the contrary deal with discharges
which are not susceptible to remediation because they are soluble
and naturally disperse. This case is distinguishable because this
fill is amenable to remediation and because it is solid and not solu-
ble. Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
FOL and RM will also argue that since there have not been
any remedial measures put in place and the fill remains in place,
MMC is still in a state of noncompliance. In Justice Scalia's con-
currence in Gwaltney he states that 'to be in violation' does not
suggest an action but rather suggests a state of violation, the op-
posite of a state of compliance. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). He further
states that "[w]hen a company has violated an effluent standard
or limitation, it remains 'in violation' of that standard or limita-
tion so long as it has not put in place remedial measures that
clearly eliminate the cause of the violation." Gwaltney 484 U.S. at
69. Since MMC has not put in place remedial measures to remove
the fill, and determined another means of disposing of overburden
from another phase of the project which it plans to conduct, it re-
mains in a state of violation because it has not eliminated the
cause of violations.
FOL and RM also will argue that courts have held that de-
fendants found in violation of CWA section 404 for filling wetlands
without a permit violate the statute every day until the fill is re-
moved. United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J.
1987). There is also support for the proposition that the violation
continues until the overburden is removed in RCRA cases. Simi-
larly to CWA, RCRA does not permit citizen suits for wholly past
violations of the statute, however, the continued presence of ille-
gally dumped materials generally constitutes a "continuing viola-
tion of RCRA." Aurora Nat'l Bank v. TriStar Mktg., Inc., 990 F.
Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1998). See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Con-
crete Sales & Serv., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 1998) ("Al-
though there is some authority that § 6972(a)(1)(A) does not apply
to past violations, citizen suits have been allowed against prior
owners and operators to remedy continuing violations resulting
from past disposal practices"); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials &
Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (disposal of
wastes in violation of the RCRA can constitute a continuing viola-
tion for purposes of a citizen suit as long as the waste has not been
remediated and the environmental effects remain remediable);
Gache v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1041
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(S.D.N.Y.1993) ("The environmental harms do not stem from the
act of dumping when waste materials slide off the dump truck but
rather after they land and begin to seep into the ground, contami-
nating the soil and water."); Fallowfield Development Corp. v.
Strunk, 1990 WL 52745 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (violation continues until
proper disposal procedures are put into effect or the hazardous
waste is remediated).
2. MMC argues that since it is no longer adding the
mining overburden to the creek, it is not currently in
violation of CWA section 301(a).
MMC will argue that under the plain meaning of the statute,
since "to be" in violation is in the present tense, the polluter must
currently be in violation of the statute in order for a court to have
jurisdiction over the citizen's claim. The Court in Gwaltney, 484
U.S. at 64, held that the present tense of the language of CWA
section 505(a)(1) required a good faith allegation that the violation
is ongoing when the complaint is filed. See also United States v.
Telluride, 884 F. Supp. 404 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that the de-
fendant was not presently discharging pollutants into the wet-
lands, and thus no present or continuing violation existed for the
purpose of the statute of limitations; the fact that a continuing
impact existed from polluter's past violations did not render the
violation continuing); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Miner-
als, 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995) (mine overburden pile was
not itself "ongoing discharge" of pollutant for purposes of CWA;
failure to retrieve pollutants which had already been discharged
was not continuing violation).
For a party to show that continuous or intermittent violations
exist, it must: 1) prove violations that continue on or after date
complaint is filed, or 2) adduce evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find continuing likelihood of recurrence in inter-
mittent or sporadic violations. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir.
1993). MMC will argue that since it is not continuing to add the
overburden into the creek, nor is there evidence that it will add
any more overburden to the creek in the future, the violation can-
not be considered continuous or intermittent. Indeed, the evi-
dence is to the contrary. MMC entered into an agreement with
the state in which it specifically agreed to not place overburden
into the creek in the future.
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IV. DOES THE STATE'S ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
PRECLUDE THE CITIZEN SUIT BY RES
JUDICATA?
A. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACT
The Full Faith and Credit Act (FFCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1994), "require[s] [federal] courts to give preclusive effect to the
judgments of state courts whenever the state court from which the
judgment emerged would give such effect." Harmon Industries,
Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999). The FFCA
states: "such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
The Supreme Court has constructed a two-part test for deter-
mining the preclusive effect of state court judgments in federal
courts: 1) the federal court should examine and then apply state
preclusion law to the judgment unless, 2) either there is an im-
plied or express statutory exception or the full and fair opportu-
nity exception warrants a suspension of the FFCA and state law
in favor of federal preclusion doctrine. See Marresse v. Am. Acad.
of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980).
1. Does the FFCA apply to state administrative
proceedings?
FOL will argue that the FFCA only applies to state adminis-
trative proceedings if they are subject to later state judicial action.
Since the administrative action by RMDENR was not subject to
any state judicial action, the FFCA does not apply. See Univ. of
Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986) (the FFCA does not apply
to administrative agency decisions that have not been first re-
viewed by a state court). In the alternative, if this Court believes
that the preclusive effect of state administrative actions under the
FFCA depends on congressional intent, FOL will argue that Con-
gress is clear when a state administrative action should preclude
a federal action under the CWA. It should only be precluded when
the action is complete and a penalty was assessed, section 309(g)
(6)(A)(iii), or the action is ongoing and, therefore, it is in these sit-
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uations that the FFCA should apply to state administrative
orders.
Moreover, MMC and RM's arguments will rely heavily on
Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999),
which held that a state enforcement action had res judicata effect,
precluding a subsequent EPA enforcement action under RCRA.
This case is different from Harmon because the action by FOL is
under the CWA and in Harmon the action was under RCRA. The
Harmon court relied on the language of RCRA to reach its decision
that the EPA was precluded from a RCRA enforcement action
where the state had brought one. 191 F.3d 894. However, CWA
lacks language of RCRA which states in its state permit program
authorizing section that an authorized state program operates "in
lieu of" the federal program and that any action taken by the state
in such a program has the "same force and effect of an action
taken by the EPA." RCRA § 3006(b), (d) (2001). By contrast, the
CWA states in its state permit authorization section that "nothing
in this section shall be construed to limit authority of the adminis-
trator to take action." CWA section 402(b). See City of Youngs-
town v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (CWA
enforcement case distinguishes Harmon because of these differ-
ences in language in CWA and RCRA). These structural differ-
ences between the CWA and RCRA are underscored by the fact
that under RCRA section 3006(b), the states submit programs "to
administer and enforce" the statute, while under CWA § 402(b),
the states submit applications only "to administer... [a] permit
program." The structure of RCRA, thus, is much more amenable
to argument that state enforcement supplants EPA enforcement
and, thus, has more of a res judicata effect than under the CWA.
Citizens and EPA are in the same position in enforcing the CWA
when it comes to the res judicata effect of a state administrative
order. If EPA is not precluded from enforcement by a state order,
neither is FOL.
MMC will argue that the FFCA does apply to state adminis-
trative proceedings if there is evidence in the federal statute being
enforced in the federal action that Congress intended the state ac-
tion to have preclusive effect. See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (unless a federal statute
specifically indicates that state agency decisions should not be
considered conclusive, factual findings of state agencies should be
given the same preclusive effect they would be accorded in the
courts of that state). MMC would argue that it is clear that the
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CWA was set up to have citizen suits merely supplement not sup-
plant state and federal administrative enforcement, and therefore,
it would seem that Congress intended that state administrative
actions should have preclusive effects in federal actions and the
FFCA should apply.
B. IS THE ACTION BY FOL PRECLUDED BY RES
JUDICATA UNDER ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE LAW?
The first question is whether or not the state would give
preclusive effect to an administrative order issued by RMDENR.
The Rocky Mountain Supreme Court held that res judicata ap-
plies to "orders of administrative agencies in the same manner as
orders of courts." State v. Williams, 118 R.M. 36, 39 (1999). The
first question having been answered in the affirmative, the second
question is what analysis the state of RM uses in determining
whether or not res judicata applies. The RM Supreme Court has
adopted Missouri law on that issue. Williams, 118 R.M. 36. The
Missouri Supreme Court has adopted the following four-part test
for determining preclusion by res judicata: 1) identity of the thing
sued for; 2) identity of cause of action; 3) identity of persons and
parties to the action; and, 4) identity of the quality in persons for
or against whom claim is against. Prentzler v. Schneider, 411
S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1966). The parties differ on how each of these
four factors apply to our case.
1. Is the thing sued for identical?
a. FOL will argue that the thing sued for is not identical
since FOL seeks different remedies than RM. FOL is seeking pen-
alties and RM was not. FOL is seeking an injunction for removal
of the fill and RM did not. See State ex rel. J.E. Dunn v. Fairness
Board of Kansas City, 960 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. App. 1998) (court held
identity of the thing sued for was not present, because the first
action sought an injunction, and the second action sought a de-
claratory judgment).
b. MMC and RM will argue on the other hand that the thing
sued for is identical because both actions seek compliance with the
statute. Penalties and an injunction are both means of obtaining
compliance under the CWA. "We have recognized on numerous oc-
casions that 'all civil penalties have some deterrent effect."'
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000)
(quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)).
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2. Is the cause of action identical?
a. FOL will argue that the causes of action are different be-
cause FOL is suing for violations after the consent agreement was
issued, which were not covered by the consent order. See Old
Timer v. Blackhawk Cent. Sanitation, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117
(D. Colo. 1999) ("because the permit violation gives rise to a sepa-
rate cause of action, res judicata bars only those violations covered
by the penalty order"). See also WEA Crestwood Plaza, LLC v.
Flamers Charburgers, Inc., 24 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 2000) (party
can bring successive claims on the same contract for damages that
have not accrued as of the time of entry of judgment in the prior
action). FOL also will argue that the causes of action are different
because FOL is suing under the CWA for water pollution and the
state brought enforcement action for improper disposal of hazard-
ous waste under its solid waste statute. Finally, FOL will argue
the causes of action are different because the first claim was
under a state statute and the second was brought under a federal
statute.
b. MMC and RM will argue that the causes of action are the
same because they arose out of the same act, contract, or transac-
tion. See Citizens Legal Envtl. Network, Inc. v. Premium Stan-
dard Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (citing
Missouri Real Estate v. St. Louis, 959 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. App.
1987)). Since both the action by RM and the action by FOL arose
from the act of MMC placing overburden in the Creek, they are
identical causes of action for the purposes of res judicata.
The fact that the actions were brought under two different
statutes is irrelevant to a determination of identity of causes of
action. If this were not true, defendants would be forced to litigate
the same claims in different forums simply because of differences
in statutes. To determine whether the present claim and the prior
claim constitute the same claim, we consider "'whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties' expectations. . . ." Lane v. Peterson,
899 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 24(2) (1980)). This case is similar to United States
v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994), in which a previous action
was brought under the CWA and the current action was brought
under CERCLA. The court determined the present action and the
prior action focused on the same underlying facts. The court
stated, "[a] litigant cannot attempt to relitigate the same claim
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under a different legal theory of recovery." Gurley, 43 F.3d at
1195. Each action concerned the appellants' disposal of hazardous
waste in a borrow pit on the Caldwell property in the 1970s and
the later release of those wastes. Thus, they are closely "related in
time, space, and origin." Furthermore, they "form a convenient
trial unit" because each action depends on the same evidence of
appellants' actions. 43 F.3d at 1195. Therefore, since, as in Gur-
ley, the facts in our case are closely related in time, space and ori-
gin, the actions of RM and FOL are identical for res judicata
purposes regardless of the statute under which the actions were
brought. See also Siesta Manor, Inc. v. Cmty. Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Mo. App.1986) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. C (1982)) ("Separate legal theo-
ries are not to be considered as separate claims, even if 'the sev-
eral legal theories depend on different shadings of the fact, or
would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for
different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.'"); Wil-
liamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 468 (3d Cir.
1950) ("While the rule may not have been clear at one time, we
think it is now clear that the fact that different statutes are relied
on does not render the claims different 'causes of action' for pur-
poses of res judicata.").
3. Are the parties to both actions identical?
FOL will argue that RM and FOL are not in privity with one
another and thus res judicata does not apply. Privity has been
based on an express or implied legal relationship that makes the
party accountable to the person sought to be estopped. Favivh v.
Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000). In our
case neither party is accountable to the other, therefore it cannot
be said that they are in privity.
b. MMC and RM will argue that the state and FOL are in
privity and thus the action by FOL is barred by res judicata. They
will argue that the relationship between governmental authorities
as public enforcers of environmental statutes and citizen suit en-
forcers of the same statutes as private attorneys general is virtu-
ally identical. See Southwest Airlines v. Texas, 546 F.2d 84 (5th
Cir. 1977); Harmon, 191 F.3d 894; US v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627
F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). MMC and RM will make a similar argu-
ment that a state and its citizens are in privity when the state,
acting as parens patriae, brings an action for damage to a public
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resource. Old Timer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (citing Satsky v. Para-
mount Communications, 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993)).
4. Is the quality of persons for or against whom the claim
is made identical?
There is no dispute here. MMC was the defendant in both
suits.
C. IS THERE AN IMPLIED OR EXPRESS STATUTORY
EXCEPTION TO THE FFCA THAT WARRANTS A
SUSPENSION OF THE FFCA AND STATE LAW IN
FAVOR OF FEDERAL PRECLUSION DOCTRINE?
FOL will argue generally that the FFCA does not apply to
state court judgments in federal court where a later federal stat-
ute contains an express or implied partial repeal of the FFCA, and
the CWA contains such an implied partial repeal of the FFCA. Its
argument falls into three sub-arguments: do section 505(b)(1)(B),
section 309(g) (6)(ii) or section 309(g)(6)(iii) of the CWA create im-
plied exemptions to the FFCA?
MMC will argue generally, however, that the Supreme Court
has reviewed other statutes as possible exceptions to the full faith
and credit statute and has rejected all but one. See Migra v. War-
ren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not
an exception and thus res judicata precludes litigation of federal
claim omitted from state claim); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461 (1982) (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., is not an
exception and thus collateral estoppel precludes employment dis-
crimination claim); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hendry Corp.,
391 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1968) (Miller Act, which is concerned with
the granting of federal contracts, vests exclusive jurisdiction of
Miller Act suits in the United States District Court for any district
where contract is to be performed and executed and not elsewhere;
state judgment in a suit between subcontractor and prime con-
tractor did not bind surety in subcontractor's suit against it).
1. Does CWA section 505(b)(1)(B) create an implied
exception to the FFCA?
a. FOL will argue that section 505(b)(1)(B) is an implied ex-
ception to full faith and credit because it specifies that state action
bars a citizen suit when a state diligently prosecutes an enforce-
ment action in court. When Congress bars suit in one specific sit-
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uation, its implied intent is not to bar suit in other situations.
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the presence of a citizen
suit provision to enforce against violations of the CWA was evi-
dence Congress intended no implied right of action to enforce
against violations of the CWA. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (Court held
that where Congress has provided "elaborate enforcement provi-
sions" for remedying the violation of a federal statute, as Congress
has done with RCRA and CERCLA, "it cannot be assumed that
Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial
remedies for private citizens suing under the statute;" it is an ele-
mental canon of statutory construction that where a statute ex-
pressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be
chary of reading others into it," (quoting Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
b. MMC and RM will argue that the language of section
505(b)(1)(B) does not imply anything for situations other than that
covered by the statute. There is a strong presumption of full faith
and credit, and Congress must be clearer in its intention in order
to override that presumption. The Court in Kremer, 456 U.S. at
468 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154
(1976)), noted that it is "a cardinal principle of statutory construc-
tion that repeals by implication are not favored." Moreover, if
FOL is right in its earlier argument that the bar under section
505(b)(1)(B) only applies to ongoing prosecutions, then it implies
nothing about res judicata, since res judicata concerns only the
preclusive effect of final judgments.
2. Does CWA section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) create an implied
exception to the FFCA?
a. FOL will argue that this section creates an implied excep-
tion for the same reasons that section 505(b)(1)(B) does.
b. MMC and RM will argue that this section does not create
an exception to FFCA for the same reasons that section
505(b)(1)(B) does not.
3. Does CWA section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii) create an implied
exception to the FFCA?
a. FOL will argue that this section was clearly intended to
create an exception to res judicata. Congress intended that a state
administrative order preclude a citizen suit only if the state as-
sessed a civil penalty in its order and then only if the penalty is
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paid. If the provision is not read as an exception to res judicata,
and the application of res judicata would have the effect of pre-
cluding citizen suits even if the state issued an administrative or-
der without assessing a civil penalty; section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii)
would have no meaning. All state administrative orders would
preclude citizen suits by reason of res judicata and this specific
preclusion would be redundant. Therefore, since there was no pen-
alty assessed by the state in the instant case, the suit by FOL
should not be precluded.
b. MMC will argue that section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii) does not cre-
ate an implied exception. It rebuts FOL's argument by pointing
out that some states do not give preclusive effect to administrative
orders. In those states, res judicata would not apply to state ad-
ministrative orders, even in situations where an administrative
agency assessed a civil penalty. The FFCA would not change this.
Therefore section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii) is not redundant, but was neces-
sary for Congress to ensure that all state administrative orders
assessing civil penalties would have preclusive effect regardless of
whether the state accords them such effect.
D. IS THERE A FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY
EXCEPTION THAT WARRANTS A SUSPENSION OF
THE FFCA AND STATE LAW IN FAVOR OF
FEDERAL PRECLUSION DOCTRINE?
According to the Supreme Court, "what a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate entails is the procedural requirements of due pro-
cess." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483 n.24. The Court added that "state
proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedu-
ral requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed
by federal law." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482.
1. FOL will argue that since it did not have the right to inter-
vene in the state action, it did not have the opportunity to be
heard, and thus is not precluded from bringing suit now.
2. MMC will argue that the full and fair opportunity excep-
tion applies only when the state proceeding does not satisfy the
minimum procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. That clause applies when a state deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467. The
exception does not apply here since the state is not depriving FOL
of life, liberty, or property. The party with property at stake is
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MMC, and they do not assert that their Due Process rights were
violated by the State.
V. IS THE SUIT BY FOL AGAINST MMC MOOT?
A case is moot where the issues presented are no longer live
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.
Texas Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998). The
issue presented by FOL is that MMC is in violation of the Clean
Water Act.
A. HAS THE CLAIM BY FOL THAT MMC IS IN VIOLATION
OF THE CWA CEASED TO BE A LIVE
CONTROVERSY?
1. FOL will argue that the case is not moot because MMC is
still in violation of the CWA, since the overburden that they dis-
charged into the wetland has not been removed. See Informed Cit-
izens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D. Tex.
1999). MMC is in violation, because the violation arises not only
from the act itself of discharging the waste into navigable water,
but also from the continuing environmental degradation as long
as the waste remains there. See North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v.
Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517 (E.D.N.C. 1989). If this Court does
not agree that the failure to remove overburden from the creek
amounts to a continuing violation, FOL will argue in the alterna-
tive that this situation falls under the voluntary cessation doc-
trine exception to mootness. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that "voluntary cessation" of the challenged conduct does not
automatically deprive a court of the power to decide the case.
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). The
Court was concerned that, if this were the case, the result would
leave defendants free to simply recommence the illegal conduct af-
ter the case was concluded. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Cas-
tle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10 (1982) (citing W. T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. at 633-36). Under this doctrine the defendant bears the bur-
den to demonstrate that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. See
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (holding
that the correct standard for determining when a defendant's vol-
untary conduct renders a case moot is whether "it is absolutely
clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be ex-
pected to recur;" a test Justice Ginsburg describes as a "formida-
ble burden."). See also, Texas Oil & Gas Ass'n, 161 F.3d 923.
2001] 227
31
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Since MMC has not decided to dispose of the materials in another
way when it reaches the next phase of its project, it is reasonably
likely that the violation will recur.
FOL will make a similar argument that this case falls under
the 'capable of repetition yet evading review' exception to moot-
ness. FOL will argue that if the court holds that the case became
moot when MMC stopped placing overburden into the creek, MMC
will be able to stop dumping into the creek whenever a suit is
brought and evade review of its actions. See Sierra Club v. Mar-
tin, 10 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997).
2. MMC and RM will argue that the case is moot because
MMC has ceased discharging fill into the wetlands. See Prisco v.
New York, 902 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Moreover, they will
argue that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply be-
cause MMC did not come into compliance voluntarily, but as a re-
sult of a state enforcement action. It did not come into compliance
as a means to avoid suit, but as a result of enforcement. Finally,
this does not fall under the 'capable of repetition yet evading re-
view' exception to mootness. In order to satisfy this exception, it is
required that: 1) there is a reasonable expectation or demon-
strated probability that the same controversy will recur with the
same complaining party and 2) the challenged action is too short
in duration to be fully litigated prior to cessation. See Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). Since the conduct of MMC will
last for a period of time, the plaintiffs will be capable of seeking an
injunction and penalties if its actions recur. This is not a situation
like a pipe discharging into a stream that can be turned off in a
second; this is process that will take some time to shut down.
B. DOES FOL HAVE A COGNIZABLE INTEREST IN THE
RESULT OF THE SUIT?
1. FOL will argue that it has a cognizable interest in the out-
come of the suit. It needs an injunction in order to force MMC to
remove the fill from the creek. Even if the court holds that MMC
is in compliance, and thus, the claim for an injunction is moot,
FOL will argue it still has a cognizable interest in civil penalties
to deter future violating conduct, and therefore, that claim is not
moot. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Strooh Dies Casting Co.,
116 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (reasoning that the deterrent effect
of a civil penalty would redress plaintiffs' injury by making the
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defendant more likely to meet its permit limitations in the future,
resulting in a cleaner river and environment).
2. MMC will argue that since they are in compliance, FOL's
claim for an injunction is moot, and therefore so is its accompany-
ing claim for civil penalties. Because the civil penalties are paid to
the US treasury, not to FOL, it is not a remedy to them. See Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). It will also
point out that in Laidlaw 528 U.S. 167, the Court made no defini-
tive ruling on mootness when a violation came into compliance
subsequent to the filing of a citizen suit complaint, but remanded
the case for a mootness determination. Moreover, even under
Laidlaw, the Court could have found a case moot where the viola-
tion ceased before the complaint was filed, as was the case here.
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